Use A-EKE instead of EKE. Doc refactoring. Preparing for 3.0 release

[govpn.git] / doc / overview.texi

diff --git a/doc/overview.texi b/doc/overview.texi
index 1886f0318e0de5bd61e37fe0757da3c75e9eb7c5..f6b81ac771075f02233896e49d58619ac6f45b16 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/overview.texi
+++ b/doc/overview.texi
@@ -11,12 +11,17 @@ goals for that daemon. Most modern widespread protocols and their
 implementations in software are too complex to be reviewed, analyzed and
 modified.
 
-State off art cryptography technologies include:
+State off art cryptography technologies includes:
 @url{http://cr.yp.to/snuffle.html, Salsa20} stream encryption,
 @url{http://143.53.36.235:8080/tea.htm, XTEA} PRP,
 @url{http://cr.yp.to/mac.html, Poly1305} message authentication,
-@url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encrypted_key_exchange, Diffie-Hellman Encrypted Key Exchange}
-(DH-EKE) powered by @url{http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html, Curve25519}.
+@url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2} password-based key derivation
+function based on @url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-2, SHA-512}
+hash function,
+@url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encrypted_key_exchange,
+Diffie-Hellman Augmented Encrypted Key Exchange}
+(DH-A-EKE) powered by @url{http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html, Curve25519} and
+@url{http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/, Ed25519} signatures.
 Strong
 @url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_password_proof, zero-knowledge}
 mutual authentication with key exchange stage is invulnerable
@@ -24,8 +29,10 @@ to man-in-the-middle attacks.
 @url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy, Perfect forward secrecy}
 property guarantee that compromising of long-term authentication
 pre-shared key can not lead to previously captured traffic decrypting.
-Rehandshaking ensures session keys rotation. MAC authentication with
-one-time keys protects against
+Compromising of peers password file on server side won't allow attacker
+to masquerade as the client, because of asymmetric @strong{verifiers}
+usage, resistant to dictionary attacks. Rehandshaking ensures session
+keys rotation. MAC authentication with one-time keys protects against
 @url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Replay_attack, replay attacks}.
 
 Server can work with several clients simultaneously. Each client is
@@ -36,7 +43,7 @@ are applied per-peer separately.
 Optional ability to hide payload packets lengths by appending
 @strong{noise} to them during transmission. Ability to generate constant
 packet rate traffic (@strong{CPR}) that will hide even the fact of
-packets appearance.
+packets appearance, their timestamps.
 
 The only platform specific requirement is TAP network interface support.
 API to that kind of device is different, OS dependent and non portable.
@@ -57,6 +64,9 @@ network interfaces on top of UDP entirely
 @item IPv6 compatible
 @item Encrypted and authenticated payload transport
 @item Relatively fast handshake
+@item Password-authenticated key exchange
+@item Server-side password verifiers are secure against dictionary attacks
+@item Attacker can not masquerade a client even with password files compromising
 @item Replay attack protection
 @item Perfect forward secrecy property
 @item Mutual two-side authentication
@@ -65,7 +75,7 @@ network interfaces on top of UDP entirely
 @item Several simultaneous clients support
 @item Per-client configuration options
 @item Hiding of payload packets length with noise
-@item Hiding of payload packets appearance with constant packet rate traffic
+@item Hiding of payload packets timestamps with constant packet rate traffic
 @item Optional built-in HTTP-server for retrieving information about
 known connected peers in @url{http://json.org/, JSON} format
 @end itemize