]> Cypherpunks.ru repositories - gostls13.git/blobdiff - src/crypto/tls/auth.go
[dev.boringcrypto] all: merge master into dev.boringcrypto
[gostls13.git] / src / crypto / tls / auth.go
index c62c9af76b6dc4192d724b54a6c33ccb1b6f0aad..53bd4d46827929fa67957844f41cb6b493dd162f 100644 (file)
@@ -18,70 +18,6 @@ import (
        "io"
 )
 
-// pickSignatureAlgorithm selects a signature algorithm that is compatible with
-// the given public key and the list of algorithms from the peer and this side.
-// The lists of signature algorithms (peerSigAlgs and ourSigAlgs) are ignored
-// for tlsVersion < VersionTLS12.
-//
-// The returned SignatureScheme codepoint is only meaningful for TLS 1.2,
-// previous TLS versions have a fixed hash function.
-func pickSignatureAlgorithm(pubkey crypto.PublicKey, peerSigAlgs, ourSigAlgs []SignatureScheme, tlsVersion uint16) (sigAlg SignatureScheme, sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, err error) {
-       if tlsVersion < VersionTLS12 || len(peerSigAlgs) == 0 {
-               // For TLS 1.1 and before, the signature algorithm could not be
-               // negotiated and the hash is fixed based on the signature type. For TLS
-               // 1.2, if the client didn't send signature_algorithms extension then we
-               // can assume that it supports SHA1. See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1.
-               switch pubkey.(type) {
-               case *rsa.PublicKey:
-                       if tlsVersion < VersionTLS12 {
-                               return 0, signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.MD5SHA1, nil
-                       } else {
-                               return PKCS1WithSHA1, signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.SHA1, nil
-                       }
-               case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
-                       return ECDSAWithSHA1, signatureECDSA, crypto.SHA1, nil
-               case ed25519.PublicKey:
-                       if tlsVersion < VersionTLS12 {
-                               // RFC 8422 specifies support for Ed25519 in TLS 1.0 and 1.1,
-                               // but it requires holding on to a handshake transcript to do a
-                               // full signature, and not even OpenSSL bothers with the
-                               // complexity, so we can't even test it properly.
-                               return 0, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: Ed25519 public keys are not supported before TLS 1.2")
-                       }
-                       return Ed25519, signatureEd25519, directSigning, nil
-               default:
-                       return 0, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pubkey)
-               }
-       }
-       for _, sigAlg := range peerSigAlgs {
-               if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg, ourSigAlgs) {
-                       continue
-               }
-               hashAlg, err := hashFromSignatureScheme(sigAlg)
-               if err != nil {
-                       panic("tls: supported signature algorithm has an unknown hash function")
-               }
-               sigType := signatureFromSignatureScheme(sigAlg)
-               switch pubkey.(type) {
-               case *rsa.PublicKey:
-                       if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
-                               return sigAlg, sigType, hashAlg, nil
-                       }
-               case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
-                       if sigType == signatureECDSA {
-                               return sigAlg, sigType, hashAlg, nil
-                       }
-               case ed25519.PublicKey:
-                       if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
-                               return sigAlg, sigType, hashAlg, nil
-                       }
-               default:
-                       return 0, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pubkey)
-               }
-       }
-       return 0, 0, 0, errors.New("tls: peer doesn't support any common signature algorithms")
-}
-
 // verifyHandshakeSignature verifies a signature against pre-hashed
 // (if required) handshake contents.
 func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash, signed, sig []byte) error {
@@ -89,30 +25,30 @@ func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc c
        case signatureECDSA:
                pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
                if !ok {
-                       return errors.New("tls: ECDSA signing requires a ECDSA public key")
+                       return fmt.Errorf("expected an ECDSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
                }
                ecdsaSig := new(ecdsaSignature)
                if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sig, ecdsaSig); err != nil {
                        return err
                }
                if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
-                       return errors.New("tls: ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values")
+                       return errors.New("ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values")
                }
                if !ecdsa.Verify(pubKey, signed, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) {
-                       return errors.New("tls: ECDSA verification failure")
+                       return errors.New("ECDSA verification failure")
                }
        case signatureEd25519:
                pubKey, ok := pubkey.(ed25519.PublicKey)
                if !ok {
-                       return errors.New("tls: Ed25519 signing requires a Ed25519 public key")
+                       return fmt.Errorf("expected an Ed25519 public key, got %T", pubkey)
                }
                if !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, signed, sig) {
-                       return errors.New("tls: Ed25519 verification failure")
+                       return errors.New("Ed25519 verification failure")
                }
        case signaturePKCS1v15:
                pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
                if !ok {
-                       return errors.New("tls: RSA signing requires a RSA public key")
+                       return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
                }
                if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig); err != nil {
                        return err
@@ -120,14 +56,14 @@ func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc c
        case signatureRSAPSS:
                pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
                if !ok {
-                       return errors.New("tls: RSA signing requires a RSA public key")
+                       return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
                }
                signOpts := &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash}
                if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig, signOpts); err != nil {
                        return err
                }
        default:
-               return errors.New("tls: unknown signature algorithm")
+               return errors.New("internal error: unknown signature type")
        }
        return nil
 }
@@ -165,12 +101,62 @@ func signedMessage(sigHash crypto.Hash, context string, transcript hash.Hash) []
        return h.Sum(nil)
 }
 
+// typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme returns the corresponding signature type and
+// crypto.Hash for a given TLS SignatureScheme.
+func typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
+       switch signatureAlgorithm {
+       case PKCS1WithSHA1, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512:
+               sigType = signaturePKCS1v15
+       case PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512:
+               sigType = signatureRSAPSS
+       case ECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
+               sigType = signatureECDSA
+       case Ed25519:
+               sigType = signatureEd25519
+       default:
+               return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %#04x", signatureAlgorithm)
+       }
+       switch signatureAlgorithm {
+       case PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1:
+               hash = crypto.SHA1
+       case PKCS1WithSHA256, PSSWithSHA256, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256:
+               hash = crypto.SHA256
+       case PKCS1WithSHA384, PSSWithSHA384, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384:
+               hash = crypto.SHA384
+       case PKCS1WithSHA512, PSSWithSHA512, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
+               hash = crypto.SHA512
+       case Ed25519:
+               hash = directSigning
+       default:
+               return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %#04x", signatureAlgorithm)
+       }
+       return sigType, hash, nil
+}
+
+// legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey returns the fixed signature type and crypto.Hash for
+// a given public key used with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, before the introduction of
+// signature algorithm negotiation.
+func legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
+       switch pub.(type) {
+       case *rsa.PublicKey:
+               return signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.MD5SHA1, nil
+       case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+               return signatureECDSA, crypto.SHA1, nil
+       case ed25519.PublicKey:
+               // RFC 8422 specifies support for Ed25519 in TLS 1.0 and 1.1,
+               // but it requires holding on to a handshake transcript to do a
+               // full signature, and not even OpenSSL bothers with the
+               // complexity, so we can't even test it properly.
+               return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: Ed25519 public keys are not supported before TLS 1.2")
+       default:
+               return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pub)
+       }
+}
+
 // signatureSchemesForCertificate returns the list of supported SignatureSchemes
 // for a given certificate, based on the public key and the protocol version.
 //
-// It does not support the crypto.Decrypter interface, so shouldn't be used for
-// server certificates in TLS 1.2 and earlier, and it must be kept in sync with
-// supportedSignatureAlgorithms.
+// This function must be kept in sync with supportedSignatureAlgorithms.
 func signatureSchemesForCertificate(version uint16, cert *Certificate) []SignatureScheme {
        priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
        if !ok {
@@ -202,12 +188,17 @@ func signatureSchemesForCertificate(version uint16, cert *Certificate) []Signatu
        case *rsa.PublicKey:
                if version != VersionTLS13 {
                        return []SignatureScheme{
+                               // Temporarily disable RSA-PSS in TLS 1.2, see Issue 32425.
+                               // PSSWithSHA256,
+                               // PSSWithSHA384,
+                               // PSSWithSHA512,
                                PKCS1WithSHA256,
                                PKCS1WithSHA384,
                                PKCS1WithSHA512,
                                PKCS1WithSHA1,
                        }
                }
+               // TLS 1.3 dropped support for PKCS#1 v1.5 in favor of RSA-PSS.
                return []SignatureScheme{
                        PSSWithSHA256,
                        PSSWithSHA384,
@@ -220,6 +211,32 @@ func signatureSchemesForCertificate(version uint16, cert *Certificate) []Signatu
        }
 }
 
+// selectSignatureScheme picks a SignatureScheme from the peer's preference list
+// that works with the selected certificate. It's only called for protocol
+// versions that support signature algorithms, so TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
+func selectSignatureScheme(vers uint16, c *Certificate, peerAlgs []SignatureScheme) (SignatureScheme, error) {
+       supportedAlgs := signatureSchemesForCertificate(vers, c)
+       if supportedAlgs == nil {
+               return 0, unsupportedCertificateError(c)
+       }
+       if len(peerAlgs) == 0 && vers == VersionTLS12 {
+               // For TLS 1.2, if the client didn't send signature_algorithms then we
+               // can assume that it supports SHA1. See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1.
+               peerAlgs = []SignatureScheme{PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1}
+       }
+       // Pick signature scheme in the peer's preference order, as our
+       // preference order is not configurable.
+       for _, preferredAlg := range peerAlgs {
+               if needFIPS() && !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
+                       continue
+               }
+               if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, supportedAlgs) {
+                       return preferredAlg, nil
+               }
+       }
+       return 0, errors.New("tls: peer doesn't support any of the certificate's signature algorithms")
+}
+
 // unsupportedCertificateError returns a helpful error for certificates with
 // an unsupported private key.
 func unsupportedCertificateError(cert *Certificate) error {