Comparison on russian page

[nncp.git] / doc / usecases.texi

diff --git a/doc/usecases.texi b/doc/usecases.texi
index 8067a93ba6e23f60473f9b178e0bea14d8340bfb..175c8e85ec8b1668bea4b2e9b9cbc2db1c50f2c6 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/usecases.texi
+++ b/doc/usecases.texi
@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@
 
 @menu
 * Occasional connection to mail server: UsecaseMail.
+* Lightweight fast POP3/IMAP4 replacement: UsecasePOP.
 * Unreliable/expensive communication link: UsecaseUnreliable.
 * Slow/expensive link for high-volume data, bad QoS: UsecaseQoS.
 * Extreme terrestrial environments, no link: UsecaseNoLink.
-* Private, isolated MitM-resistant networks: UsecaseF2F.
+* Private, isolated MitM/Sybil-resistant networks: UsecaseF2F.
 * Highly secure isolated air-gap computers: UsecaseAirgap.
 * Network censorship bypassing: UsecaseCensor.
 * Reconnaissance, spying, intelligence, covert agents: UsecaseSpy.
@@ -38,6 +39,22 @@ stored in NNCP @ref{Spool, spool}, that after exchanging and tossing
 will call local @command{sendmail} command to deliver them just like
 that happened on the same machine.
 
+@node UsecasePOP
+@section Lightweight fast POP3/IMAP4 replacement
+
+@ref{nncp-daemon} can be connected with @ref{nncp-caller} for a long
+time -- it can create TCP connection that lasts for many hours. When
+SMTP server receives mail, it will call @ref{nncp-mail} creating an
+outbound encrypted packet. Daemon checks outbound directory each second
+and immediately sends notification about undelivered packets to remote
+side, that also downloads it at once.
+
+There are only dozens of bytes notifying about incoming packets, dozens
+of bytes telling to download those packets. Mail packets are compressed
+(POP3 and IMAP4 as a rule do not). You have lightweight, compressed,
+low-delay, reliable link for the mail with strong encryption and mutual
+sides authentication!
+
 @node UsecaseUnreliable
 @section Unreliable/expensive communication link
 
@@ -123,7 +140,7 @@ further processing. nncp-xfer is the only command used with removable
 devices.
 
 @node UsecaseF2F
-@section Private, isolated MitM-resistant networks
+@section Private, isolated MitM/Sybil-resistant networks
 
 All Internet connections can be eavesdropped and forged. You
 @strong{have to} to use encryption and authentication for securing them.
@@ -135,7 +152,7 @@ peer-to-peer networking is dangerous thing to do.
 
 The most popular cryptographic protocol in Internet is
 @url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security, TLS} that
-is very hard to implement right and hard to configure for mutual
+is very hard to implement correctly and hard to configure for mutual
 participants authentication. Not all TLS configurations and related
 protocols provide @url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy,
 forward secrecy} property -- all previously intercepted packets could be