1 // Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
3 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
5 // Package x509 parses X.509-encoded keys and certificates.
33 "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
34 cryptobyte_asn1 "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
37 // pkixPublicKey reflects a PKIX public key structure. See SubjectPublicKeyInfo
39 type pkixPublicKey struct {
40 Algo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
41 BitString asn1.BitString
44 // ParsePKIXPublicKey parses a public key in PKIX, ASN.1 DER form.
45 // The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
46 // (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1).
48 // It returns a *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, or
49 // ed25519.PublicKey. More types might be supported in the future.
51 // This kind of key is commonly encoded in PEM blocks of type "PUBLIC KEY".
52 func ParsePKIXPublicKey(derBytes []byte) (pub interface{}, err error) {
54 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pki); err != nil {
55 if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pkcs1PublicKey{}); err == nil {
56 return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to parse public key (use ParsePKCS1PublicKey instead for this key format)")
59 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
60 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after ASN.1 of public-key")
62 algo := getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(pki.Algorithm.Algorithm)
63 if algo == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm {
64 return nil, errors.New("x509: unknown public key algorithm")
66 return parsePublicKey(algo, &pki)
69 func marshalPublicKey(pub interface{}) (publicKeyBytes []byte, publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) {
70 switch pub := pub.(type) {
72 publicKeyBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(pkcs1PublicKey{
77 return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, err
79 publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyRSA
80 // This is a NULL parameters value which is required by
81 // RFC 3279, Section 2.3.1.
82 publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters = asn1.NullRawValue
83 case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
84 publicKeyBytes = elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, pub.X, pub.Y)
85 oid, ok := oidFromNamedCurve(pub.Curve)
87 return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve")
89 publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyECDSA
91 paramBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(oid)
95 publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters.FullBytes = paramBytes
96 case ed25519.PublicKey:
98 publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyEd25519
100 return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, fmt.Errorf("x509: unsupported public key type: %T", pub)
103 return publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, nil
106 // MarshalPKIXPublicKey converts a public key to PKIX, ASN.1 DER form.
107 // The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
108 // (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1).
110 // The following key types are currently supported: *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey
111 // and ed25519.PublicKey. Unsupported key types result in an error.
113 // This kind of key is commonly encoded in PEM blocks of type "PUBLIC KEY".
114 func MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub interface{}) ([]byte, error) {
115 var publicKeyBytes []byte
116 var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
119 if publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(pub); err != nil {
123 pkix := pkixPublicKey{
124 Algo: publicKeyAlgorithm,
125 BitString: asn1.BitString{
126 Bytes: publicKeyBytes,
127 BitLength: 8 * len(publicKeyBytes),
131 ret, _ := asn1.Marshal(pkix)
135 // These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificates.:
137 type certificate struct {
139 TBSCertificate tbsCertificate
140 SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
141 SignatureValue asn1.BitString
144 type tbsCertificate struct {
146 Version int `asn1:"optional,explicit,default:0,tag:0"`
147 SerialNumber *big.Int
148 SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
151 Subject asn1.RawValue
152 PublicKey publicKeyInfo
153 UniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"`
154 SubjectUniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:2"`
155 Extensions []pkix.Extension `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:3"`
158 type dsaAlgorithmParameters struct {
162 type validity struct {
163 NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time
166 type publicKeyInfo struct {
168 Algorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
169 PublicKey asn1.BitString
173 type authKeyId struct {
174 Id []byte `asn1:"optional,tag:0"`
177 type SignatureAlgorithm int
180 UnknownSignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm = iota
182 MD2WithRSA // Unsupported.
183 MD5WithRSA // Only supported for signing, not verification.
188 DSAWithSHA1 // Unsupported.
189 DSAWithSHA256 // Unsupported.
200 func (algo SignatureAlgorithm) isRSAPSS() bool {
202 case SHA256WithRSAPSS, SHA384WithRSAPSS, SHA512WithRSAPSS:
209 func (algo SignatureAlgorithm) String() string {
210 for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
211 if details.algo == algo {
215 return strconv.Itoa(int(algo))
218 type PublicKeyAlgorithm int
221 UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm = iota
228 var publicKeyAlgoName = [...]string{
235 func (algo PublicKeyAlgorithm) String() string {
236 if 0 < algo && int(algo) < len(publicKeyAlgoName) {
237 return publicKeyAlgoName[algo]
239 return strconv.Itoa(int(algo))
242 // OIDs for signature algorithms
244 // pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
245 // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }
248 // RFC 3279 2.2.1 RSA Signature Algorithms
250 // md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 }
252 // md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 }
254 // sha-1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 }
256 // dsaWithSha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
257 // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 3 }
259 // RFC 3279 2.2.3 ECDSA Signature Algorithm
261 // ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
262 // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045)
263 // signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA1(1)}
266 // RFC 4055 5 PKCS #1 Version 1.5
268 // sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
270 // sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
272 // sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }
275 // RFC 5758 3.1 DSA Signature Algorithms
277 // dsaWithSha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
278 // joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
279 // csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2}
281 // RFC 5758 3.2 ECDSA Signature Algorithm
283 // ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
284 // us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
286 // ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
287 // us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
289 // ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
290 // us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
293 // RFC 8410 3 Curve25519 and Curve448 Algorithm Identifiers
295 // id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 }
298 oidSignatureMD2WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 2}
299 oidSignatureMD5WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 4}
300 oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 5}
301 oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11}
302 oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 12}
303 oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 13}
304 oidSignatureRSAPSS = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 10}
305 oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 3}
306 oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 3, 2}
307 oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 1}
308 oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 2}
309 oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 3}
310 oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 4}
311 oidSignatureEd25519 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 101, 112}
313 oidSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1}
314 oidSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2}
315 oidSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3}
317 oidMGF1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 8}
319 // oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA means the same as oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA
320 // but it's specified by ISO. Microsoft's makecert.exe has been known
321 // to produce certificates with this OID.
322 oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 29}
325 var signatureAlgorithmDetails = []struct {
326 algo SignatureAlgorithm
328 oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier
329 pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm
332 {MD2WithRSA, "MD2-RSA", oidSignatureMD2WithRSA, RSA, crypto.Hash(0) /* no value for MD2 */},
333 {MD5WithRSA, "MD5-RSA", oidSignatureMD5WithRSA, RSA, crypto.MD5},
334 {SHA1WithRSA, "SHA1-RSA", oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA1},
335 {SHA1WithRSA, "SHA1-RSA", oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA1},
336 {SHA256WithRSA, "SHA256-RSA", oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA256},
337 {SHA384WithRSA, "SHA384-RSA", oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA384},
338 {SHA512WithRSA, "SHA512-RSA", oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA512},
339 {SHA256WithRSAPSS, "SHA256-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA256},
340 {SHA384WithRSAPSS, "SHA384-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA384},
341 {SHA512WithRSAPSS, "SHA512-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA512},
342 {DSAWithSHA1, "DSA-SHA1", oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1, DSA, crypto.SHA1},
343 {DSAWithSHA256, "DSA-SHA256", oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256, DSA, crypto.SHA256},
344 {ECDSAWithSHA1, "ECDSA-SHA1", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSA, crypto.SHA1},
345 {ECDSAWithSHA256, "ECDSA-SHA256", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256, ECDSA, crypto.SHA256},
346 {ECDSAWithSHA384, "ECDSA-SHA384", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384, ECDSA, crypto.SHA384},
347 {ECDSAWithSHA512, "ECDSA-SHA512", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512, ECDSA, crypto.SHA512},
348 {PureEd25519, "Ed25519", oidSignatureEd25519, Ed25519, crypto.Hash(0) /* no pre-hashing */},
351 // hashToPSSParameters contains the DER encoded RSA PSS parameters for the
352 // SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 hashes as defined in RFC 3447, Appendix A.2.3.
353 // The parameters contain the following values:
354 // * hashAlgorithm contains the associated hash identifier with NULL parameters
355 // * maskGenAlgorithm always contains the default mgf1SHA1 identifier
356 // * saltLength contains the length of the associated hash
357 // * trailerField always contains the default trailerFieldBC value
358 var hashToPSSParameters = map[crypto.Hash]asn1.RawValue{
359 crypto.SHA256: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 32}},
360 crypto.SHA384: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 48}},
361 crypto.SHA512: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 64}},
364 // pssParameters reflects the parameters in an AlgorithmIdentifier that
365 // specifies RSA PSS. See RFC 3447, Appendix A.2.3.
366 type pssParameters struct {
367 // The following three fields are not marked as
368 // optional because the default values specify SHA-1,
369 // which is no longer suitable for use in signatures.
370 Hash pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:0"`
371 MGF pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:1"`
372 SaltLength int `asn1:"explicit,tag:2"`
373 TrailerField int `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:3,default:1"`
376 func getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(ai pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier) SignatureAlgorithm {
377 if ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureEd25519) {
378 // RFC 8410, Section 3
379 // > For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent.
380 if len(ai.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 {
381 return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
385 if !ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureRSAPSS) {
386 for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
387 if ai.Algorithm.Equal(details.oid) {
391 return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
394 // RSA PSS is special because it encodes important parameters
395 // in the Parameters.
397 var params pssParameters
398 if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ai.Parameters.FullBytes, ¶ms); err != nil {
399 return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
402 var mgf1HashFunc pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
403 if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(params.MGF.Parameters.FullBytes, &mgf1HashFunc); err != nil {
404 return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
407 // PSS is greatly overburdened with options. This code forces them into
408 // three buckets by requiring that the MGF1 hash function always match the
409 // message hash function (as recommended in RFC 3447, Section 8.1), that the
410 // salt length matches the hash length, and that the trailer field has the
412 if (len(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes)) ||
413 !params.MGF.Algorithm.Equal(oidMGF1) ||
414 !mgf1HashFunc.Algorithm.Equal(params.Hash.Algorithm) ||
415 (len(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes)) ||
416 params.TrailerField != 1 {
417 return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
421 case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA256) && params.SaltLength == 32:
422 return SHA256WithRSAPSS
423 case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA384) && params.SaltLength == 48:
424 return SHA384WithRSAPSS
425 case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA512) && params.SaltLength == 64:
426 return SHA512WithRSAPSS
429 return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
432 // RFC 3279, 2.3 Public Key Algorithms
434 // pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
435 // rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }
437 // rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { pkcs1-1 1 }
439 // id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
440 // x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 }
442 // RFC 5480, 2.1.1 Unrestricted Algorithm Identifier and Parameters
444 // id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
445 // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
447 oidPublicKeyRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1}
448 oidPublicKeyDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 1}
449 oidPublicKeyECDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1}
450 oidPublicKeyEd25519 = oidSignatureEd25519
453 func getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) PublicKeyAlgorithm {
455 case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyRSA):
457 case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyDSA):
459 case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyECDSA):
461 case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyEd25519):
464 return UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm
467 // RFC 5480, 2.1.1.1. Named Curve
469 // secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
470 // iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 }
472 // secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
473 // iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3)
476 // secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
477 // iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 }
479 // secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
480 // iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 }
482 // NB: secp256r1 is equivalent to prime256v1
484 oidNamedCurveP224 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 33}
485 oidNamedCurveP256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7}
486 oidNamedCurveP384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 34}
487 oidNamedCurveP521 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 35}
490 func namedCurveFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) elliptic.Curve {
492 case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP224):
493 return elliptic.P224()
494 case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP256):
495 return elliptic.P256()
496 case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP384):
497 return elliptic.P384()
498 case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP521):
499 return elliptic.P521()
504 func oidFromNamedCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) (asn1.ObjectIdentifier, bool) {
506 case elliptic.P224():
507 return oidNamedCurveP224, true
508 case elliptic.P256():
509 return oidNamedCurveP256, true
510 case elliptic.P384():
511 return oidNamedCurveP384, true
512 case elliptic.P521():
513 return oidNamedCurveP521, true
519 // KeyUsage represents the set of actions that are valid for a given key. It's
520 // a bitmap of the KeyUsage* constants.
524 KeyUsageDigitalSignature KeyUsage = 1 << iota
525 KeyUsageContentCommitment
526 KeyUsageKeyEncipherment
527 KeyUsageDataEncipherment
535 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.12 Extended Key Usage
537 // anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 }
539 // id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 }
541 // id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 }
542 // id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 }
543 // id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 }
544 // id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 }
545 // id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 }
546 // id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
548 oidExtKeyUsageAny = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 37, 0}
549 oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 1}
550 oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 2}
551 oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 3}
552 oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 4}
553 oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 5}
554 oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 6}
555 oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 7}
556 oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 8}
557 oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 9}
558 oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 10, 3, 3}
559 oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 113730, 4, 1}
560 oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 2, 1, 22}
561 oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 61, 1, 1}
564 // ExtKeyUsage represents an extended set of actions that are valid for a given key.
565 // Each of the ExtKeyUsage* constants define a unique action.
569 ExtKeyUsageAny ExtKeyUsage = iota
570 ExtKeyUsageServerAuth
571 ExtKeyUsageClientAuth
572 ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning
573 ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection
574 ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem
575 ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel
577 ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping
578 ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning
579 ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto
580 ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto
581 ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning
582 ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning
585 // extKeyUsageOIDs contains the mapping between an ExtKeyUsage and its OID.
586 var extKeyUsageOIDs = []struct {
587 extKeyUsage ExtKeyUsage
588 oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier
590 {ExtKeyUsageAny, oidExtKeyUsageAny},
591 {ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
592 {ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
593 {ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning},
594 {ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection, oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection},
595 {ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem},
596 {ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel},
597 {ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser},
598 {ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping, oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping},
599 {ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning, oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning},
600 {ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto},
601 {ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto},
602 {ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning},
603 {ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning},
606 func extKeyUsageFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (eku ExtKeyUsage, ok bool) {
607 for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs {
608 if oid.Equal(pair.oid) {
609 return pair.extKeyUsage, true
615 func oidFromExtKeyUsage(eku ExtKeyUsage) (oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, ok bool) {
616 for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs {
617 if eku == pair.extKeyUsage {
618 return pair.oid, true
624 // A Certificate represents an X.509 certificate.
625 type Certificate struct {
626 Raw []byte // Complete ASN.1 DER content (certificate, signature algorithm and signature).
627 RawTBSCertificate []byte // Certificate part of raw ASN.1 DER content.
628 RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo []byte // DER encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
629 RawSubject []byte // DER encoded Subject
630 RawIssuer []byte // DER encoded Issuer
633 SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm
635 PublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm
636 PublicKey interface{}
639 SerialNumber *big.Int
642 NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time // Validity bounds.
645 // Extensions contains raw X.509 extensions. When parsing certificates,
646 // this can be used to extract non-critical extensions that are not
647 // parsed by this package. When marshaling certificates, the Extensions
648 // field is ignored, see ExtraExtensions.
649 Extensions []pkix.Extension
651 // ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any
652 // marshaled certificates. Values override any extensions that would
653 // otherwise be produced based on the other fields. The ExtraExtensions
654 // field is not populated when parsing certificates, see Extensions.
655 ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension
657 // UnhandledCriticalExtensions contains a list of extension IDs that
658 // were not (fully) processed when parsing. Verify will fail if this
659 // slice is non-empty, unless verification is delegated to an OS
660 // library which understands all the critical extensions.
662 // Users can access these extensions using Extensions and can remove
663 // elements from this slice if they believe that they have been
665 UnhandledCriticalExtensions []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
667 ExtKeyUsage []ExtKeyUsage // Sequence of extended key usages.
668 UnknownExtKeyUsage []asn1.ObjectIdentifier // Encountered extended key usages unknown to this package.
670 // BasicConstraintsValid indicates whether IsCA, MaxPathLen,
671 // and MaxPathLenZero are valid.
672 BasicConstraintsValid bool
675 // MaxPathLen and MaxPathLenZero indicate the presence and
676 // value of the BasicConstraints' "pathLenConstraint".
678 // When parsing a certificate, a positive non-zero MaxPathLen
679 // means that the field was specified, -1 means it was unset,
680 // and MaxPathLenZero being true mean that the field was
681 // explicitly set to zero. The case of MaxPathLen==0 with MaxPathLenZero==false
682 // should be treated equivalent to -1 (unset).
684 // When generating a certificate, an unset pathLenConstraint
685 // can be requested with either MaxPathLen == -1 or using the
686 // zero value for both MaxPathLen and MaxPathLenZero.
688 // MaxPathLenZero indicates that BasicConstraintsValid==true
689 // and MaxPathLen==0 should be interpreted as an actual
690 // maximum path length of zero. Otherwise, that combination is
691 // interpreted as MaxPathLen not being set.
695 AuthorityKeyId []byte
697 // RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1 (Authority Information Access)
699 IssuingCertificateURL []string
701 // Subject Alternate Name values. (Note that these values may not be valid
702 // if invalid values were contained within a parsed certificate. For
703 // example, an element of DNSNames may not be a valid DNS domain name.)
705 EmailAddresses []string
710 PermittedDNSDomainsCritical bool // if true then the name constraints are marked critical.
711 PermittedDNSDomains []string
712 ExcludedDNSDomains []string
713 PermittedIPRanges []*net.IPNet
714 ExcludedIPRanges []*net.IPNet
715 PermittedEmailAddresses []string
716 ExcludedEmailAddresses []string
717 PermittedURIDomains []string
718 ExcludedURIDomains []string
720 // CRL Distribution Points
721 CRLDistributionPoints []string
723 PolicyIdentifiers []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
726 // ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm results from attempting to perform an operation that
727 // involves algorithms that are not currently implemented.
728 var ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm = errors.New("x509: cannot verify signature: algorithm unimplemented")
730 // An InsecureAlgorithmError
731 type InsecureAlgorithmError SignatureAlgorithm
733 func (e InsecureAlgorithmError) Error() string {
734 return fmt.Sprintf("x509: cannot verify signature: insecure algorithm %v", SignatureAlgorithm(e))
737 // ConstraintViolationError results when a requested usage is not permitted by
738 // a certificate. For example: checking a signature when the public key isn't a
739 // certificate signing key.
740 type ConstraintViolationError struct{}
742 func (ConstraintViolationError) Error() string {
743 return "x509: invalid signature: parent certificate cannot sign this kind of certificate"
746 func (c *Certificate) Equal(other *Certificate) bool {
747 if c == nil || other == nil {
750 return bytes.Equal(c.Raw, other.Raw)
753 func (c *Certificate) hasSANExtension() bool {
754 return oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, c.Extensions)
757 // CheckSignatureFrom verifies that the signature on c is a valid signature
759 func (c *Certificate) CheckSignatureFrom(parent *Certificate) error {
760 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9:
761 // "If the basic constraints extension is not present in a version 3
762 // certificate, or the extension is present but the cA boolean is not
763 // asserted, then the certified public key MUST NOT be used to verify
764 // certificate signatures."
765 if parent.Version == 3 && !parent.BasicConstraintsValid ||
766 parent.BasicConstraintsValid && !parent.IsCA {
767 return ConstraintViolationError{}
770 if parent.KeyUsage != 0 && parent.KeyUsage&KeyUsageCertSign == 0 {
771 return ConstraintViolationError{}
774 if parent.PublicKeyAlgorithm == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm {
775 return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
778 // TODO(agl): don't ignore the path length constraint.
780 return parent.CheckSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificate, c.Signature)
783 // CheckSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from
785 func (c *Certificate) CheckSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte) error {
786 return checkSignature(algo, signed, signature, c.PublicKey)
789 func (c *Certificate) hasNameConstraints() bool {
790 return oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, c.Extensions)
793 func (c *Certificate) getSANExtension() []byte {
794 for _, e := range c.Extensions {
795 if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) {
802 func signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(expectedPubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm, pubKey interface{}) error {
803 return fmt.Errorf("x509: signature algorithm specifies an %s public key, but have public key of type %T", expectedPubKeyAlgo.String(), pubKey)
806 // CheckSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from
807 // a crypto.PublicKey.
808 func checkSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte, publicKey crypto.PublicKey) (err error) {
809 var hashType crypto.Hash
810 var pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm
812 for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
813 if details.algo == algo {
814 hashType = details.hash
815 pubKeyAlgo = details.pubKeyAlgo
821 if pubKeyAlgo != Ed25519 {
822 return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
825 return InsecureAlgorithmError(algo)
827 if !hashType.Available() {
828 return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
835 switch pub := publicKey.(type) {
837 if pubKeyAlgo != RSA {
838 return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub)
841 return rsa.VerifyPSS(pub, hashType, signed, signature, &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash})
843 return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, hashType, signed, signature)
845 case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
846 if pubKeyAlgo != ECDSA {
847 return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub)
849 if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pub, signed, signature) {
850 return errors.New("x509: ECDSA verification failure")
853 case ed25519.PublicKey:
854 if pubKeyAlgo != Ed25519 {
855 return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub)
857 if !ed25519.Verify(pub, signed, signature) {
858 return errors.New("x509: Ed25519 verification failure")
862 return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
865 // CheckCRLSignature checks that the signature in crl is from c.
866 func (c *Certificate) CheckCRLSignature(crl *pkix.CertificateList) error {
867 algo := getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(crl.SignatureAlgorithm)
868 return c.CheckSignature(algo, crl.TBSCertList.Raw, crl.SignatureValue.RightAlign())
871 type UnhandledCriticalExtension struct{}
873 func (h UnhandledCriticalExtension) Error() string {
874 return "x509: unhandled critical extension"
877 type basicConstraints struct {
878 IsCA bool `asn1:"optional"`
879 MaxPathLen int `asn1:"optional,default:-1"`
883 type policyInformation struct {
884 Policy asn1.ObjectIdentifier
885 // policyQualifiers omitted
896 type authorityInfoAccess struct {
897 Method asn1.ObjectIdentifier
898 Location asn1.RawValue
901 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.14
902 type distributionPoint struct {
903 DistributionPoint distributionPointName `asn1:"optional,tag:0"`
904 Reason asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"`
905 CRLIssuer asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:2"`
908 type distributionPointName struct {
909 FullName []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:0"`
910 RelativeName pkix.RDNSequence `asn1:"optional,tag:1"`
913 func parsePublicKey(algo PublicKeyAlgorithm, keyData *publicKeyInfo) (interface{}, error) {
914 asn1Data := keyData.PublicKey.RightAlign()
917 // RSA public keys must have a NULL in the parameters.
918 // See RFC 3279, Section 2.3.1.
919 if !bytes.Equal(keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes) {
920 return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA key missing NULL parameters")
923 p := new(pkcs1PublicKey)
924 rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, p)
929 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after RSA public key")
933 return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA modulus is not a positive number")
936 return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA public exponent is not a positive number")
939 pub := &rsa.PublicKey{
946 rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &p)
951 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after DSA public key")
953 paramsData := keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes
954 params := new(dsaAlgorithmParameters)
955 rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(paramsData, params)
960 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after DSA parameters")
962 if p.Sign() <= 0 || params.P.Sign() <= 0 || params.Q.Sign() <= 0 || params.G.Sign() <= 0 {
963 return nil, errors.New("x509: zero or negative DSA parameter")
965 pub := &dsa.PublicKey{
966 Parameters: dsa.Parameters{
975 paramsData := keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes
976 namedCurveOID := new(asn1.ObjectIdentifier)
977 rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(paramsData, namedCurveOID)
979 return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to parse ECDSA parameters as named curve")
982 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after ECDSA parameters")
984 namedCurve := namedCurveFromOID(*namedCurveOID)
985 if namedCurve == nil {
986 return nil, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve")
988 x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(namedCurve, asn1Data)
990 return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal elliptic curve point")
992 pub := &ecdsa.PublicKey{
999 // RFC 8410, Section 3
1000 // > For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent.
1001 if len(keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 {
1002 return nil, errors.New("x509: Ed25519 key encoded with illegal parameters")
1004 if len(asn1Data) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
1005 return nil, errors.New("x509: wrong Ed25519 public key size")
1007 pub := make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize)
1009 return ed25519.PublicKey(pub), nil
1015 func forEachSAN(extension []byte, callback func(tag int, data []byte) error) error {
1016 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.6
1018 // SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
1020 // GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
1022 // GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
1023 // otherName [0] OtherName,
1024 // rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
1025 // dNSName [2] IA5String,
1026 // x400Address [3] ORAddress,
1027 // directoryName [4] Name,
1028 // ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
1029 // uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
1030 // iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
1031 // registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
1032 var seq asn1.RawValue
1033 rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(extension, &seq)
1036 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1037 return errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 extension")
1039 if !seq.IsCompound || seq.Tag != 16 || seq.Class != 0 {
1040 return asn1.StructuralError{Msg: "bad SAN sequence"}
1046 rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(rest, &v)
1051 if err := callback(v.Tag, v.Bytes); err != nil {
1059 func parseSANExtension(value []byte) (dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, uris []*url.URL, err error) {
1060 err = forEachSAN(value, func(tag int, data []byte) error {
1063 email := string(data)
1064 if err := isIA5String(email); err != nil {
1065 return errors.New("x509: SAN rfc822Name is malformed")
1067 emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, email)
1069 name := string(data)
1070 if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil {
1071 return errors.New("x509: SAN dNSName is malformed")
1073 dnsNames = append(dnsNames, string(name))
1075 uriStr := string(data)
1076 if err := isIA5String(uriStr); err != nil {
1077 return errors.New("x509: SAN uniformResourceIdentifier is malformed")
1079 uri, err := url.Parse(uriStr)
1081 return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: %s", uriStr, err)
1083 if len(uri.Host) > 0 {
1084 if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(uri.Host); !ok {
1085 return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: invalid domain", uriStr)
1088 uris = append(uris, uri)
1091 case net.IPv4len, net.IPv6len:
1092 ipAddresses = append(ipAddresses, data)
1094 return errors.New("x509: cannot parse IP address of length " + strconv.Itoa(len(data)))
1104 // isValidIPMask reports whether mask consists of zero or more 1 bits, followed by zero bits.
1105 func isValidIPMask(mask []byte) bool {
1108 for _, b := range mask {
1118 case 0x00, 0x80, 0xc0, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0xf8, 0xfc, 0xfe:
1129 func parseNameConstraintsExtension(out *Certificate, e pkix.Extension) (unhandled bool, err error) {
1130 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.10
1132 // NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
1133 // permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
1134 // excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }
1136 // GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree
1138 // GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
1139 // base GeneralName,
1140 // minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
1141 // maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL }
1143 // BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
1145 outer := cryptobyte.String(e.Value)
1146 var toplevel, permitted, excluded cryptobyte.String
1147 var havePermitted, haveExcluded bool
1148 if !outer.ReadASN1(&toplevel, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
1150 !toplevel.ReadOptionalASN1(&permitted, &havePermitted, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific().Constructed()) ||
1151 !toplevel.ReadOptionalASN1(&excluded, &haveExcluded, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific().Constructed()) ||
1153 return false, errors.New("x509: invalid NameConstraints extension")
1156 if !havePermitted && !haveExcluded || len(permitted) == 0 && len(excluded) == 0 {
1157 // From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.10:
1158 // “either the permittedSubtrees field
1159 // or the excludedSubtrees MUST be
1161 return false, errors.New("x509: empty name constraints extension")
1164 getValues := func(subtrees cryptobyte.String) (dnsNames []string, ips []*net.IPNet, emails, uriDomains []string, err error) {
1165 for !subtrees.Empty() {
1166 var seq, value cryptobyte.String
1167 var tag cryptobyte_asn1.Tag
1168 if !subtrees.ReadASN1(&seq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
1169 !seq.ReadAnyASN1(&value, &tag) {
1170 return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: invalid NameConstraints extension")
1174 dnsTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(2).ContextSpecific()
1175 emailTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific()
1176 ipTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(7).ContextSpecific()
1177 uriTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific()
1182 domain := string(value)
1183 if err := isIA5String(domain); err != nil {
1184 return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error())
1187 trimmedDomain := domain
1188 if len(trimmedDomain) > 0 && trimmedDomain[0] == '.' {
1189 // constraints can have a leading
1190 // period to exclude the domain
1191 // itself, but that's not valid in a
1192 // normal domain name.
1193 trimmedDomain = trimmedDomain[1:]
1195 if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedDomain); !ok {
1196 return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse dnsName constraint %q", domain)
1198 dnsNames = append(dnsNames, domain)
1214 return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: IP constraint contained value of length %d", l)
1217 if !isValidIPMask(mask) {
1218 return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: IP constraint contained invalid mask %x", mask)
1221 ips = append(ips, &net.IPNet{IP: net.IP(ip), Mask: net.IPMask(mask)})
1224 constraint := string(value)
1225 if err := isIA5String(constraint); err != nil {
1226 return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error())
1229 // If the constraint contains an @ then
1230 // it specifies an exact mailbox name.
1231 if strings.Contains(constraint, "@") {
1232 if _, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(constraint); !ok {
1233 return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse rfc822Name constraint %q", constraint)
1236 // Otherwise it's a domain name.
1237 domain := constraint
1238 if len(domain) > 0 && domain[0] == '.' {
1241 if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(domain); !ok {
1242 return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse rfc822Name constraint %q", constraint)
1245 emails = append(emails, constraint)
1248 domain := string(value)
1249 if err := isIA5String(domain); err != nil {
1250 return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error())
1253 if net.ParseIP(domain) != nil {
1254 return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse URI constraint %q: cannot be IP address", domain)
1257 trimmedDomain := domain
1258 if len(trimmedDomain) > 0 && trimmedDomain[0] == '.' {
1259 // constraints can have a leading
1260 // period to exclude the domain itself,
1261 // but that's not valid in a normal
1263 trimmedDomain = trimmedDomain[1:]
1265 if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedDomain); !ok {
1266 return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse URI constraint %q", domain)
1268 uriDomains = append(uriDomains, domain)
1275 return dnsNames, ips, emails, uriDomains, nil
1278 if out.PermittedDNSDomains, out.PermittedIPRanges, out.PermittedEmailAddresses, out.PermittedURIDomains, err = getValues(permitted); err != nil {
1281 if out.ExcludedDNSDomains, out.ExcludedIPRanges, out.ExcludedEmailAddresses, out.ExcludedURIDomains, err = getValues(excluded); err != nil {
1284 out.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical = e.Critical
1286 return unhandled, nil
1289 func parseCertificate(in *certificate) (*Certificate, error) {
1290 out := new(Certificate)
1292 out.RawTBSCertificate = in.TBSCertificate.Raw
1293 out.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo = in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey.Raw
1294 out.RawSubject = in.TBSCertificate.Subject.FullBytes
1295 out.RawIssuer = in.TBSCertificate.Issuer.FullBytes
1297 out.Signature = in.SignatureValue.RightAlign()
1298 out.SignatureAlgorithm =
1299 getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(in.TBSCertificate.SignatureAlgorithm)
1301 out.PublicKeyAlgorithm =
1302 getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey.Algorithm.Algorithm)
1304 out.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(out.PublicKeyAlgorithm, &in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey)
1309 out.Version = in.TBSCertificate.Version + 1
1310 out.SerialNumber = in.TBSCertificate.SerialNumber
1312 var issuer, subject pkix.RDNSequence
1313 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCertificate.Subject.FullBytes, &subject); err != nil {
1315 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1316 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 subject")
1318 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCertificate.Issuer.FullBytes, &issuer); err != nil {
1320 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1321 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 issuer")
1324 out.Issuer.FillFromRDNSequence(&issuer)
1325 out.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(&subject)
1327 out.NotBefore = in.TBSCertificate.Validity.NotBefore
1328 out.NotAfter = in.TBSCertificate.Validity.NotAfter
1330 for _, e := range in.TBSCertificate.Extensions {
1331 out.Extensions = append(out.Extensions, e)
1334 if len(e.Id) == 4 && e.Id[0] == 2 && e.Id[1] == 5 && e.Id[2] == 29 {
1337 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.3
1338 var usageBits asn1.BitString
1339 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &usageBits); err != nil {
1341 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1342 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 KeyUsage")
1346 for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
1347 if usageBits.At(i) != 0 {
1348 usage |= 1 << uint(i)
1351 out.KeyUsage = KeyUsage(usage)
1354 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9
1355 var constraints basicConstraints
1356 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &constraints); err != nil {
1358 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1359 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 BasicConstraints")
1362 out.BasicConstraintsValid = true
1363 out.IsCA = constraints.IsCA
1364 out.MaxPathLen = constraints.MaxPathLen
1365 out.MaxPathLenZero = out.MaxPathLen == 0
1366 // TODO: map out.MaxPathLen to 0 if it has the -1 default value? (Issue 19285)
1368 out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, out.URIs, err = parseSANExtension(e.Value)
1373 if len(out.DNSNames) == 0 && len(out.EmailAddresses) == 0 && len(out.IPAddresses) == 0 && len(out.URIs) == 0 {
1374 // If we didn't parse anything then we do the critical check, below.
1379 unhandled, err = parseNameConstraintsExtension(out, e)
1385 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.13
1387 // CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint
1389 // DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
1390 // distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
1391 // reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
1392 // cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL }
1394 // DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
1395 // fullName [0] GeneralNames,
1396 // nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName }
1398 var cdp []distributionPoint
1399 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &cdp); err != nil {
1401 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1402 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 CRL distribution point")
1405 for _, dp := range cdp {
1406 // Per RFC 5280, 4.2.1.13, one of distributionPoint or cRLIssuer may be empty.
1407 if len(dp.DistributionPoint.FullName) == 0 {
1411 for _, fullName := range dp.DistributionPoint.FullName {
1412 if fullName.Tag == 6 {
1413 out.CRLDistributionPoints = append(out.CRLDistributionPoints, string(fullName.Bytes))
1419 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1
1421 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &a); err != nil {
1423 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1424 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 authority key-id")
1426 out.AuthorityKeyId = a.Id
1429 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
1431 // id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 }
1433 // ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
1435 // KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
1437 var keyUsage []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
1438 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &keyUsage); err != nil {
1440 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1441 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 ExtendedKeyUsage")
1444 for _, u := range keyUsage {
1445 if extKeyUsage, ok := extKeyUsageFromOID(u); ok {
1446 out.ExtKeyUsage = append(out.ExtKeyUsage, extKeyUsage)
1448 out.UnknownExtKeyUsage = append(out.UnknownExtKeyUsage, u)
1453 // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.2
1455 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &keyid); err != nil {
1457 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1458 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 key-id")
1460 out.SubjectKeyId = keyid
1463 // RFC 5280 4.2.1.4: Certificate Policies
1464 var policies []policyInformation
1465 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &policies); err != nil {
1467 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1468 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 certificate policies")
1470 out.PolicyIdentifiers = make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, len(policies))
1471 for i, policy := range policies {
1472 out.PolicyIdentifiers[i] = policy.Policy
1476 // Unknown extensions are recorded if critical.
1479 } else if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess) {
1480 // RFC 5280 4.2.2.1: Authority Information Access
1481 var aia []authorityInfoAccess
1482 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &aia); err != nil {
1484 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
1485 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 authority information")
1488 for _, v := range aia {
1489 // GeneralName: uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String
1490 if v.Location.Tag != 6 {
1493 if v.Method.Equal(oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp) {
1494 out.OCSPServer = append(out.OCSPServer, string(v.Location.Bytes))
1495 } else if v.Method.Equal(oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers) {
1496 out.IssuingCertificateURL = append(out.IssuingCertificateURL, string(v.Location.Bytes))
1500 // Unknown extensions are recorded if critical.
1504 if e.Critical && unhandled {
1505 out.UnhandledCriticalExtensions = append(out.UnhandledCriticalExtensions, e.Id)
1512 // ParseCertificate parses a single certificate from the given ASN.1 DER data.
1513 func ParseCertificate(asn1Data []byte) (*Certificate, error) {
1514 var cert certificate
1515 rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &cert)
1520 return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"}
1523 return parseCertificate(&cert)
1526 // ParseCertificates parses one or more certificates from the given ASN.1 DER
1527 // data. The certificates must be concatenated with no intermediate padding.
1528 func ParseCertificates(asn1Data []byte) ([]*Certificate, error) {
1529 var v []*certificate
1531 for len(asn1Data) > 0 {
1532 cert := new(certificate)
1534 asn1Data, err = asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, cert)
1541 ret := make([]*Certificate, len(v))
1542 for i, ci := range v {
1543 cert, err := parseCertificate(ci)
1553 func reverseBitsInAByte(in byte) byte {
1555 b2 := b1>>2&0x33 | b1<<2&0xcc
1556 b3 := b2>>1&0x55 | b2<<1&0xaa
1560 // asn1BitLength returns the bit-length of bitString by considering the
1561 // most-significant bit in a byte to be the "first" bit. This convention
1562 // matches ASN.1, but differs from almost everything else.
1563 func asn1BitLength(bitString []byte) int {
1564 bitLen := len(bitString) * 8
1566 for i := range bitString {
1567 b := bitString[len(bitString)-i-1]
1569 for bit := uint(0); bit < 8; bit++ {
1570 if (b>>bit)&1 == 1 {
1581 oidExtensionSubjectKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 14}
1582 oidExtensionKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 15}
1583 oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 37}
1584 oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 35}
1585 oidExtensionBasicConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 19}
1586 oidExtensionSubjectAltName = []int{2, 5, 29, 17}
1587 oidExtensionCertificatePolicies = []int{2, 5, 29, 32}
1588 oidExtensionNameConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 30}
1589 oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints = []int{2, 5, 29, 31}
1590 oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess = []int{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 1}
1591 oidExtensionCRLNumber = []int{2, 5, 29, 20}
1595 oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1}
1596 oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 2}
1599 // oidNotInExtensions reports whether an extension with the given oid exists in
1601 func oidInExtensions(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, extensions []pkix.Extension) bool {
1602 for _, e := range extensions {
1603 if e.Id.Equal(oid) {
1610 // marshalSANs marshals a list of addresses into a the contents of an X.509
1611 // SubjectAlternativeName extension.
1612 func marshalSANs(dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, uris []*url.URL) (derBytes []byte, err error) {
1613 var rawValues []asn1.RawValue
1614 for _, name := range dnsNames {
1615 if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil {
1618 rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeDNS, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)})
1620 for _, email := range emailAddresses {
1621 if err := isIA5String(email); err != nil {
1624 rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeEmail, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(email)})
1626 for _, rawIP := range ipAddresses {
1627 // If possible, we always want to encode IPv4 addresses in 4 bytes.
1632 rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeIP, Class: 2, Bytes: ip})
1634 for _, uri := range uris {
1635 uriStr := uri.String()
1636 if err := isIA5String(uriStr); err != nil {
1639 rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeURI, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(uriStr)})
1641 return asn1.Marshal(rawValues)
1644 func isIA5String(s string) error {
1645 for _, r := range s {
1646 // Per RFC5280 "IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters"
1647 if r > unicode.MaxASCII {
1648 return fmt.Errorf("x509: %q cannot be encoded as an IA5String", s)
1655 func buildExtensions(template *Certificate, subjectIsEmpty bool, authorityKeyId []byte, subjectKeyId []byte) (ret []pkix.Extension, err error) {
1656 ret = make([]pkix.Extension, 10 /* maximum number of elements. */)
1659 if template.KeyUsage != 0 &&
1660 !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) {
1661 ret[n].Id = oidExtensionKeyUsage
1662 ret[n].Critical = true
1665 a[0] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(template.KeyUsage))
1666 a[1] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(template.KeyUsage >> 8))
1674 ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(asn1.BitString{Bytes: bitString, BitLength: asn1BitLength(bitString)})
1681 if (len(template.ExtKeyUsage) > 0 || len(template.UnknownExtKeyUsage) > 0) &&
1682 !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) {
1683 ret[n].Id = oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage
1685 var oids []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
1686 for _, u := range template.ExtKeyUsage {
1687 if oid, ok := oidFromExtKeyUsage(u); ok {
1688 oids = append(oids, oid)
1690 err = errors.New("x509: unknown extended key usage")
1695 oids = append(oids, template.UnknownExtKeyUsage...)
1697 ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(oids)
1704 if template.BasicConstraintsValid && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionBasicConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) {
1705 // Leaving MaxPathLen as zero indicates that no maximum path
1706 // length is desired, unless MaxPathLenZero is set. A value of
1707 // -1 causes encoding/asn1 to omit the value as desired.
1708 maxPathLen := template.MaxPathLen
1709 if maxPathLen == 0 && !template.MaxPathLenZero {
1712 ret[n].Id = oidExtensionBasicConstraints
1713 ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(basicConstraints{template.IsCA, maxPathLen})
1714 ret[n].Critical = true
1721 if len(subjectKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) {
1722 ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectKeyId
1723 ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(subjectKeyId)
1730 if len(authorityKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) {
1731 ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId
1732 ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{authorityKeyId})
1739 if (len(template.OCSPServer) > 0 || len(template.IssuingCertificateURL) > 0) &&
1740 !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess, template.ExtraExtensions) {
1741 ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess
1742 var aiaValues []authorityInfoAccess
1743 for _, name := range template.OCSPServer {
1744 aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{
1745 Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp,
1746 Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)},
1749 for _, name := range template.IssuingCertificateURL {
1750 aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{
1751 Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers,
1752 Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)},
1755 ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(aiaValues)
1762 if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0 || len(template.URIs) > 0) &&
1763 !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) {
1764 ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectAltName
1765 // From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.6:
1766 // “If the subject field contains an empty sequence ... then
1767 // subjectAltName extension ... is marked as critical”
1768 ret[n].Critical = subjectIsEmpty
1769 ret[n].Value, err = marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses, template.URIs)
1776 if len(template.PolicyIdentifiers) > 0 &&
1777 !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCertificatePolicies, template.ExtraExtensions) {
1778 ret[n].Id = oidExtensionCertificatePolicies
1779 policies := make([]policyInformation, len(template.PolicyIdentifiers))
1780 for i, policy := range template.PolicyIdentifiers {
1781 policies[i].Policy = policy
1783 ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(policies)
1790 if (len(template.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedDNSDomains) > 0 ||
1791 len(template.PermittedIPRanges) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedIPRanges) > 0 ||
1792 len(template.PermittedEmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedEmailAddresses) > 0 ||
1793 len(template.PermittedURIDomains) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedURIDomains) > 0) &&
1794 !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) {
1795 ret[n].Id = oidExtensionNameConstraints
1796 ret[n].Critical = template.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical
1798 ipAndMask := func(ipNet *net.IPNet) []byte {
1799 maskedIP := ipNet.IP.Mask(ipNet.Mask)
1800 ipAndMask := make([]byte, 0, len(maskedIP)+len(ipNet.Mask))
1801 ipAndMask = append(ipAndMask, maskedIP...)
1802 ipAndMask = append(ipAndMask, ipNet.Mask...)
1806 serialiseConstraints := func(dns []string, ips []*net.IPNet, emails []string, uriDomains []string) (der []byte, err error) {
1807 var b cryptobyte.Builder
1809 for _, name := range dns {
1810 if err = isIA5String(name); err != nil {
1814 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1815 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(2).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1816 b.AddBytes([]byte(name))
1821 for _, ipNet := range ips {
1822 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1823 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(7).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1824 b.AddBytes(ipAndMask(ipNet))
1829 for _, email := range emails {
1830 if err = isIA5String(email); err != nil {
1834 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1835 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1836 b.AddBytes([]byte(email))
1841 for _, uriDomain := range uriDomains {
1842 if err = isIA5String(uriDomain); err != nil {
1846 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1847 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1848 b.AddBytes([]byte(uriDomain))
1856 permitted, err := serialiseConstraints(template.PermittedDNSDomains, template.PermittedIPRanges, template.PermittedEmailAddresses, template.PermittedURIDomains)
1861 excluded, err := serialiseConstraints(template.ExcludedDNSDomains, template.ExcludedIPRanges, template.ExcludedEmailAddresses, template.ExcludedURIDomains)
1866 var b cryptobyte.Builder
1867 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1868 if len(permitted) > 0 {
1869 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1870 b.AddBytes(permitted)
1874 if len(excluded) > 0 {
1875 b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
1876 b.AddBytes(excluded)
1881 ret[n].Value, err = b.Bytes()
1888 if len(template.CRLDistributionPoints) > 0 &&
1889 !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints, template.ExtraExtensions) {
1890 ret[n].Id = oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints
1892 var crlDp []distributionPoint
1893 for _, name := range template.CRLDistributionPoints {
1894 dp := distributionPoint{
1895 DistributionPoint: distributionPointName{
1896 FullName: []asn1.RawValue{
1897 {Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)},
1901 crlDp = append(crlDp, dp)
1904 ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(crlDp)
1911 // Adding another extension here? Remember to update the maximum number
1912 // of elements in the make() at the top of the function and the list of
1913 // template fields used in CreateCertificate documentation.
1915 return append(ret[:n], template.ExtraExtensions...), nil
1918 func subjectBytes(cert *Certificate) ([]byte, error) {
1919 if len(cert.RawSubject) > 0 {
1920 return cert.RawSubject, nil
1923 return asn1.Marshal(cert.Subject.ToRDNSequence())
1926 // signingParamsForPublicKey returns the parameters to use for signing with
1927 // priv. If requestedSigAlgo is not zero then it overrides the default
1928 // signature algorithm.
1929 func signingParamsForPublicKey(pub interface{}, requestedSigAlgo SignatureAlgorithm) (hashFunc crypto.Hash, sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) {
1930 var pubType PublicKeyAlgorithm
1932 switch pub := pub.(type) {
1933 case *rsa.PublicKey:
1935 hashFunc = crypto.SHA256
1936 sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA
1937 sigAlgo.Parameters = asn1.NullRawValue
1939 case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
1943 case elliptic.P224(), elliptic.P256():
1944 hashFunc = crypto.SHA256
1945 sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256
1946 case elliptic.P384():
1947 hashFunc = crypto.SHA384
1948 sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384
1949 case elliptic.P521():
1950 hashFunc = crypto.SHA512
1951 sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512
1953 err = errors.New("x509: unknown elliptic curve")
1956 case ed25519.PublicKey:
1958 sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureEd25519
1961 err = errors.New("x509: only RSA, ECDSA and Ed25519 keys supported")
1968 if requestedSigAlgo == 0 {
1973 for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
1974 if details.algo == requestedSigAlgo {
1975 if details.pubKeyAlgo != pubType {
1976 err = errors.New("x509: requested SignatureAlgorithm does not match private key type")
1979 sigAlgo.Algorithm, hashFunc = details.oid, details.hash
1980 if hashFunc == 0 && pubType != Ed25519 {
1981 err = errors.New("x509: cannot sign with hash function requested")
1984 if requestedSigAlgo.isRSAPSS() {
1985 sigAlgo.Parameters = hashToPSSParameters[hashFunc]
1993 err = errors.New("x509: unknown SignatureAlgorithm")
1999 // emptyASN1Subject is the ASN.1 DER encoding of an empty Subject, which is
2000 // just an empty SEQUENCE.
2001 var emptyASN1Subject = []byte{0x30, 0}
2003 // CreateCertificate creates a new X.509v3 certificate based on a template.
2004 // The following members of template are used:
2007 // - BasicConstraintsValid
2008 // - CRLDistributionPoints
2011 // - ExcludedDNSDomains
2012 // - ExcludedEmailAddresses
2013 // - ExcludedIPRanges
2014 // - ExcludedURIDomains
2016 // - ExtraExtensions
2019 // - IssuingCertificateURL
2026 // - PermittedDNSDomains
2027 // - PermittedDNSDomainsCritical
2028 // - PermittedEmailAddresses
2029 // - PermittedIPRanges
2030 // - PermittedURIDomains
2031 // - PolicyIdentifiers
2033 // - SignatureAlgorithm
2037 // - UnknownExtKeyUsage
2039 // The certificate is signed by parent. If parent is equal to template then the
2040 // certificate is self-signed. The parameter pub is the public key of the
2041 // signee and priv is the private key of the signer.
2043 // The returned slice is the certificate in DER encoding.
2045 // The currently supported key types are *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey and
2046 // ed25519.PublicKey. pub must be a supported key type, and priv must be a
2047 // crypto.Signer with a supported public key.
2049 // The AuthorityKeyId will be taken from the SubjectKeyId of parent, if any,
2050 // unless the resulting certificate is self-signed. Otherwise the value from
2051 // template will be used.
2053 // If SubjectKeyId from template is empty and the template is a CA, SubjectKeyId
2054 // will be generated from the hash of the public key.
2055 func CreateCertificate(rand io.Reader, template, parent *Certificate, pub, priv interface{}) (cert []byte, err error) {
2056 key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
2058 return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
2061 if template.SerialNumber == nil {
2062 return nil, errors.New("x509: no SerialNumber given")
2065 if template.BasicConstraintsValid && !template.IsCA && template.MaxPathLen != -1 && (template.MaxPathLen != 0 || template.MaxPathLenZero) {
2066 return nil, errors.New("x509: only CAs are allowed to specify MaxPathLen")
2069 hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm)
2074 publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err := marshalPublicKey(pub)
2079 asn1Issuer, err := subjectBytes(parent)
2084 asn1Subject, err := subjectBytes(template)
2089 authorityKeyId := template.AuthorityKeyId
2090 if !bytes.Equal(asn1Issuer, asn1Subject) && len(parent.SubjectKeyId) > 0 {
2091 authorityKeyId = parent.SubjectKeyId
2094 subjectKeyId := template.SubjectKeyId
2095 if len(subjectKeyId) == 0 && template.IsCA {
2096 // SubjectKeyId generated using method 1 in RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.2:
2097 // (1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the
2098 // value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag,
2099 // length, and number of unused bits).
2100 h := sha1.Sum(publicKeyBytes)
2104 extensions, err := buildExtensions(template, bytes.Equal(asn1Subject, emptyASN1Subject), authorityKeyId, subjectKeyId)
2109 encodedPublicKey := asn1.BitString{BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8, Bytes: publicKeyBytes}
2110 c := tbsCertificate{
2112 SerialNumber: template.SerialNumber,
2113 SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm,
2114 Issuer: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Issuer},
2115 Validity: validity{template.NotBefore.UTC(), template.NotAfter.UTC()},
2116 Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject},
2117 PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{nil, publicKeyAlgorithm, encodedPublicKey},
2118 Extensions: extensions,
2121 tbsCertContents, err := asn1.Marshal(c)
2125 c.Raw = tbsCertContents
2127 signed := tbsCertContents
2134 var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc
2135 if template.SignatureAlgorithm != 0 && template.SignatureAlgorithm.isRSAPSS() {
2136 signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{
2137 SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash,
2142 var signature []byte
2143 signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, signerOpts)
2148 signedCert, err := asn1.Marshal(certificate{
2152 asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8},
2158 // Check the signature to ensure the crypto.Signer behaved correctly.
2159 if err := checkSignature(getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(signatureAlgorithm), c.Raw, signature, key.Public()); err != nil {
2160 return nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: signature over certificate returned by signer is invalid: %w", err)
2163 return signedCert, nil
2166 // pemCRLPrefix is the magic string that indicates that we have a PEM encoded
2168 var pemCRLPrefix = []byte("-----BEGIN X509 CRL")
2170 // pemType is the type of a PEM encoded CRL.
2171 var pemType = "X509 CRL"
2173 // ParseCRL parses a CRL from the given bytes. It's often the case that PEM
2174 // encoded CRLs will appear where they should be DER encoded, so this function
2175 // will transparently handle PEM encoding as long as there isn't any leading
2177 func ParseCRL(crlBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) {
2178 if bytes.HasPrefix(crlBytes, pemCRLPrefix) {
2179 block, _ := pem.Decode(crlBytes)
2180 if block != nil && block.Type == pemType {
2181 crlBytes = block.Bytes
2184 return ParseDERCRL(crlBytes)
2187 // ParseDERCRL parses a DER encoded CRL from the given bytes.
2188 func ParseDERCRL(derBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) {
2189 certList := new(pkix.CertificateList)
2190 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, certList); err != nil {
2192 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
2193 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after CRL")
2195 return certList, nil
2198 // CreateCRL returns a DER encoded CRL, signed by this Certificate, that
2199 // contains the given list of revoked certificates.
2201 // Note: this method does not generate an RFC 5280 conformant X.509 v2 CRL.
2202 // To generate a standards compliant CRL, use CreateRevocationList instead.
2203 func (c *Certificate) CreateCRL(rand io.Reader, priv interface{}, revokedCerts []pkix.RevokedCertificate, now, expiry time.Time) (crlBytes []byte, err error) {
2204 key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
2206 return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
2209 hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), 0)
2214 // Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280.
2215 revokedCertsUTC := make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(revokedCerts))
2216 for i, rc := range revokedCerts {
2217 rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC()
2218 revokedCertsUTC[i] = rc
2221 tbsCertList := pkix.TBSCertificateList{
2223 Signature: signatureAlgorithm,
2224 Issuer: c.Subject.ToRDNSequence(),
2225 ThisUpdate: now.UTC(),
2226 NextUpdate: expiry.UTC(),
2227 RevokedCertificates: revokedCertsUTC,
2231 if len(c.SubjectKeyId) > 0 {
2232 var aki pkix.Extension
2233 aki.Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId
2234 aki.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: c.SubjectKeyId})
2238 tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, aki)
2241 tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList)
2246 signed := tbsCertListContents
2253 var signature []byte
2254 signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, hashFunc)
2259 return asn1.Marshal(pkix.CertificateList{
2260 TBSCertList: tbsCertList,
2261 SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm,
2262 SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8},
2266 // CertificateRequest represents a PKCS #10, certificate signature request.
2267 type CertificateRequest struct {
2268 Raw []byte // Complete ASN.1 DER content (CSR, signature algorithm and signature).
2269 RawTBSCertificateRequest []byte // Certificate request info part of raw ASN.1 DER content.
2270 RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo []byte // DER encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
2271 RawSubject []byte // DER encoded Subject.
2275 SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm
2277 PublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm
2278 PublicKey interface{}
2282 // Attributes contains the CSR attributes that can parse as
2283 // pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET.
2285 // Deprecated: Use Extensions and ExtraExtensions instead for parsing and
2286 // generating the requestedExtensions attribute.
2287 Attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
2289 // Extensions contains all requested extensions, in raw form. When parsing
2290 // CSRs, this can be used to extract extensions that are not parsed by this
2292 Extensions []pkix.Extension
2294 // ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any CSR
2295 // marshaled by CreateCertificateRequest. Values override any extensions
2296 // that would otherwise be produced based on the other fields but are
2297 // overridden by any extensions specified in Attributes.
2299 // The ExtraExtensions field is not populated by ParseCertificateRequest,
2300 // see Extensions instead.
2301 ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension
2303 // Subject Alternate Name values.
2305 EmailAddresses []string
2306 IPAddresses []net.IP
2310 // These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificate
2311 // signature requests (see RFC 2986):
2313 type tbsCertificateRequest struct {
2316 Subject asn1.RawValue
2317 PublicKey publicKeyInfo
2318 RawAttributes []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"tag:0"`
2321 type certificateRequest struct {
2323 TBSCSR tbsCertificateRequest
2324 SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
2325 SignatureValue asn1.BitString
2328 // oidExtensionRequest is a PKCS #9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER that indicates requested
2329 // extensions in a CSR.
2330 var oidExtensionRequest = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 14}
2332 // newRawAttributes converts AttributeTypeAndValueSETs from a template
2333 // CertificateRequest's Attributes into tbsCertificateRequest RawAttributes.
2334 func newRawAttributes(attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET) ([]asn1.RawValue, error) {
2335 var rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue
2336 b, err := asn1.Marshal(attributes)
2340 rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawAttributes)
2345 return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal raw CSR Attributes")
2347 return rawAttributes, nil
2350 // parseRawAttributes Unmarshals RawAttributes into AttributeTypeAndValueSETs.
2351 func parseRawAttributes(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET {
2352 var attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
2353 for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes {
2354 var attr pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
2355 rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr)
2356 // Ignore attributes that don't parse into pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
2357 // (i.e.: challengePassword or unstructuredName).
2358 if err == nil && len(rest) == 0 {
2359 attributes = append(attributes, attr)
2365 // parseCSRExtensions parses the attributes from a CSR and extracts any
2366 // requested extensions.
2367 func parseCSRExtensions(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) ([]pkix.Extension, error) {
2368 // pkcs10Attribute reflects the Attribute structure from RFC 2986, Section 4.1.
2369 type pkcs10Attribute struct {
2370 Id asn1.ObjectIdentifier
2371 Values []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"set"`
2374 var ret []pkix.Extension
2375 for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes {
2376 var attr pkcs10Attribute
2377 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr); err != nil || len(rest) != 0 || len(attr.Values) == 0 {
2378 // Ignore attributes that don't parse.
2382 if !attr.Id.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) {
2386 var extensions []pkix.Extension
2387 if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(attr.Values[0].FullBytes, &extensions); err != nil {
2390 ret = append(ret, extensions...)
2396 // CreateCertificateRequest creates a new certificate request based on a
2397 // template. The following members of template are used:
2399 // - SignatureAlgorithm
2405 // - ExtraExtensions
2406 // - Attributes (deprecated)
2408 // priv is the private key to sign the CSR with, and the corresponding public
2409 // key will be included in the CSR. It must implement crypto.Signer and its
2410 // Public() method must return a *rsa.PublicKey or a *ecdsa.PublicKey or a
2411 // ed25519.PublicKey. (A *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey or
2412 // ed25519.PrivateKey satisfies this.)
2414 // The returned slice is the certificate request in DER encoding.
2415 func CreateCertificateRequest(rand io.Reader, template *CertificateRequest, priv interface{}) (csr []byte, err error) {
2416 key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
2418 return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
2421 var hashFunc crypto.Hash
2422 var sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
2423 hashFunc, sigAlgo, err = signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm)
2428 var publicKeyBytes []byte
2429 var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
2430 publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(key.Public())
2435 var extensions []pkix.Extension
2437 if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0 || len(template.URIs) > 0) &&
2438 !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) {
2439 sanBytes, err := marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses, template.URIs)
2444 extensions = append(extensions, pkix.Extension{
2445 Id: oidExtensionSubjectAltName,
2450 extensions = append(extensions, template.ExtraExtensions...)
2452 // Make a copy of template.Attributes because we may alter it below.
2453 attributes := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET, 0, len(template.Attributes))
2454 for _, attr := range template.Attributes {
2455 values := make([][]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, len(attr.Value))
2456 copy(values, attr.Value)
2457 attributes = append(attributes, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET{
2463 extensionsAppended := false
2464 if len(extensions) > 0 {
2465 // Append the extensions to an existing attribute if possible.
2466 for _, atvSet := range attributes {
2467 if !atvSet.Type.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) || len(atvSet.Value) == 0 {
2471 // specifiedExtensions contains all the extensions that we
2472 // found specified via template.Attributes.
2473 specifiedExtensions := make(map[string]bool)
2475 for _, atvs := range atvSet.Value {
2476 for _, atv := range atvs {
2477 specifiedExtensions[atv.Type.String()] = true
2481 newValue := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, 0, len(atvSet.Value[0])+len(extensions))
2482 newValue = append(newValue, atvSet.Value[0]...)
2484 for _, e := range extensions {
2485 if specifiedExtensions[e.Id.String()] {
2486 // Attributes already contained a value for
2487 // this extension and it takes priority.
2491 newValue = append(newValue, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue{
2492 // There is no place for the critical
2493 // flag in an AttributeTypeAndValue.
2499 atvSet.Value[0] = newValue
2500 extensionsAppended = true
2505 rawAttributes, err := newRawAttributes(attributes)
2510 // If not included in attributes, add a new attribute for the
2512 if len(extensions) > 0 && !extensionsAppended {
2514 Type asn1.ObjectIdentifier
2515 Value [][]pkix.Extension `asn1:"set"`
2517 Type: oidExtensionRequest,
2518 Value: [][]pkix.Extension{extensions},
2521 b, err := asn1.Marshal(attr)
2523 return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to serialise extensions attribute: " + err.Error())
2526 var rawValue asn1.RawValue
2527 if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawValue); err != nil {
2531 rawAttributes = append(rawAttributes, rawValue)
2534 asn1Subject := template.RawSubject
2535 if len(asn1Subject) == 0 {
2536 asn1Subject, err = asn1.Marshal(template.Subject.ToRDNSequence())
2542 tbsCSR := tbsCertificateRequest{
2543 Version: 0, // PKCS #10, RFC 2986
2544 Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject},
2545 PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{
2546 Algorithm: publicKeyAlgorithm,
2547 PublicKey: asn1.BitString{
2548 Bytes: publicKeyBytes,
2549 BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8,
2552 RawAttributes: rawAttributes,
2555 tbsCSRContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCSR)
2559 tbsCSR.Raw = tbsCSRContents
2561 signed := tbsCSRContents
2568 var signature []byte
2569 signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, hashFunc)
2574 return asn1.Marshal(certificateRequest{
2576 SignatureAlgorithm: sigAlgo,
2577 SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{
2579 BitLength: len(signature) * 8,
2584 // ParseCertificateRequest parses a single certificate request from the
2585 // given ASN.1 DER data.
2586 func ParseCertificateRequest(asn1Data []byte) (*CertificateRequest, error) {
2587 var csr certificateRequest
2589 rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &csr)
2592 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
2593 return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"}
2596 return parseCertificateRequest(&csr)
2599 func parseCertificateRequest(in *certificateRequest) (*CertificateRequest, error) {
2600 out := &CertificateRequest{
2602 RawTBSCertificateRequest: in.TBSCSR.Raw,
2603 RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo: in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Raw,
2604 RawSubject: in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes,
2606 Signature: in.SignatureValue.RightAlign(),
2607 SignatureAlgorithm: getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(in.SignatureAlgorithm),
2609 PublicKeyAlgorithm: getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Algorithm.Algorithm),
2611 Version: in.TBSCSR.Version,
2612 Attributes: parseRawAttributes(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes),
2616 out.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(out.PublicKeyAlgorithm, &in.TBSCSR.PublicKey)
2621 var subject pkix.RDNSequence
2622 if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes, &subject); err != nil {
2624 } else if len(rest) != 0 {
2625 return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 Subject")
2628 out.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(&subject)
2630 if out.Extensions, err = parseCSRExtensions(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes); err != nil {
2634 for _, extension := range out.Extensions {
2635 if extension.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) {
2636 out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, out.URIs, err = parseSANExtension(extension.Value)
2646 // CheckSignature reports whether the signature on c is valid.
2647 func (c *CertificateRequest) CheckSignature() error {
2648 return checkSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificateRequest, c.Signature, c.PublicKey)
2651 // RevocationList contains the fields used to create an X.509 v2 Certificate
2652 // Revocation list with CreateRevocationList.
2653 type RevocationList struct {
2654 // SignatureAlgorithm is used to determine the signature algorithm to be
2655 // used when signing the CRL. If 0 the default algorithm for the signing
2656 // key will be used.
2657 SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm
2659 // RevokedCertificates is used to populate the revokedCertificates
2660 // sequence in the CRL, it may be empty. RevokedCertificates may be nil,
2661 // in which case an empty CRL will be created.
2662 RevokedCertificates []pkix.RevokedCertificate
2664 // Number is used to populate the X.509 v2 cRLNumber extension in the CRL,
2665 // which should be a monotonically increasing sequence number for a given
2666 // CRL scope and CRL issuer.
2668 // ThisUpdate is used to populate the thisUpdate field in the CRL, which
2669 // indicates the issuance date of the CRL.
2670 ThisUpdate time.Time
2671 // NextUpdate is used to populate the nextUpdate field in the CRL, which
2672 // indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued. NextUpdate
2673 // must be greater than ThisUpdate.
2674 NextUpdate time.Time
2675 // ExtraExtensions contains any additional extensions to add directly to
2677 ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension
2680 // CreateRevocationList creates a new X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation List,
2681 // according to RFC 5280, based on template.
2683 // The CRL is signed by priv which should be the private key associated with
2684 // the public key in the issuer certificate.
2686 // The issuer may not be nil, and the crlSign bit must be set in KeyUsage in
2687 // order to use it as a CRL issuer.
2689 // The issuer distinguished name CRL field and authority key identifier
2690 // extension are populated using the issuer certificate. issuer must have
2691 // SubjectKeyId set.
2692 func CreateRevocationList(rand io.Reader, template *RevocationList, issuer *Certificate, priv crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) {
2693 if template == nil {
2694 return nil, errors.New("x509: template can not be nil")
2697 return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer can not be nil")
2699 if (issuer.KeyUsage & KeyUsageCRLSign) == 0 {
2700 return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer must have the crlSign key usage bit set")
2702 if len(issuer.SubjectKeyId) == 0 {
2703 return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer certificate doesn't contain a subject key identifier")
2705 if template.NextUpdate.Before(template.ThisUpdate) {
2706 return nil, errors.New("x509: template.ThisUpdate is after template.NextUpdate")
2708 if template.Number == nil {
2709 return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains nil Number field")
2712 hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(priv.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm)
2717 // Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280.
2718 revokedCertsUTC := make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(template.RevokedCertificates))
2719 for i, rc := range template.RevokedCertificates {
2720 rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC()
2721 revokedCertsUTC[i] = rc
2724 aki, err := asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: issuer.SubjectKeyId})
2728 crlNum, err := asn1.Marshal(template.Number)
2733 tbsCertList := pkix.TBSCertificateList{
2735 Signature: signatureAlgorithm,
2736 Issuer: issuer.Subject.ToRDNSequence(),
2737 ThisUpdate: template.ThisUpdate.UTC(),
2738 NextUpdate: template.NextUpdate.UTC(),
2739 Extensions: []pkix.Extension{
2741 Id: oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId,
2745 Id: oidExtensionCRLNumber,
2750 if len(revokedCertsUTC) > 0 {
2751 tbsCertList.RevokedCertificates = revokedCertsUTC
2754 if len(template.ExtraExtensions) > 0 {
2755 tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, template.ExtraExtensions...)
2758 tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList)
2763 input := tbsCertListContents
2766 h.Write(tbsCertListContents)
2769 var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc
2770 if template.SignatureAlgorithm.isRSAPSS() {
2771 signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{
2772 SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash,
2777 signature, err := priv.Sign(rand, input, signerOpts)
2782 return asn1.Marshal(pkix.CertificateList{
2783 TBSCertList: tbsCertList,
2784 SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm,
2785 SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8},