// GoGOST -- Pure Go GOST cryptographic functions library // Copyright (C) 2015-2024 Sergey Matveev // // This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify // it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by // the Free Software Foundation, version 3 of the License. // // This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, // but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of // MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the // GNU General Public License for more details. // // You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License // along with this program. If not, see . // Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) block cipher mode. package mgm import ( "crypto/cipher" "crypto/hmac" "encoding/binary" "errors" "fmt" ) var InvalidTag = errors.New("gogost/mgm: invalid authentication tag") type Mul interface { Mul(x, y []byte) []byte } type MGM struct { MaxSize uint64 BlockSize int TagSize int cipher cipher.Block icn []byte bufP []byte bufC []byte padded []byte sum []byte mul Mul } func NewMGM(cipher cipher.Block, tagSize int) (cipher.AEAD, error) { blockSize := cipher.BlockSize() if !(blockSize == 8 || blockSize == 16) { return nil, errors.New("gogost/mgm: only {64|128} blocksizes allowed") } if tagSize < 4 || tagSize > blockSize { return nil, fmt.Errorf("gogost/mgm: invalid tag size (4<=%d<=%d)", tagSize, blockSize) } mgm := MGM{ MaxSize: uint64(1<= 0; i-- { data[i]++ if data[i] != 0 { return } } } func xor(dst, src1, src2 []byte) { for i := 0; i < len(src1); i++ { dst[i] = src1[i] ^ src2[i] } } func (mgm *MGM) validateNonce(nonce []byte) { if len(nonce) != mgm.BlockSize { panic("nonce length must be equal to cipher's blocksize") } if nonce[0]&0x80 > 0 { panic("nonce must not have higher bit set") } } func (mgm *MGM) validateSizes(text, additionalData []byte) { if len(text) == 0 && len(additionalData) == 0 { panic("at least either *text or additionalData must be provided") } if uint64(len(additionalData)) > mgm.MaxSize { panic("additionalData is too big") } if uint64(len(text)+len(additionalData)) > mgm.MaxSize { panic("*text with additionalData are too big") } } func (mgm *MGM) auth(out, text, ad []byte) { for i := 0; i < mgm.BlockSize; i++ { mgm.sum[i] = 0 } adLen := len(ad) * 8 textLen := len(text) * 8 mgm.icn[0] |= 0x80 mgm.cipher.Encrypt(mgm.bufP, mgm.icn) // Z_1 = E_K(1 || ICN) for len(ad) >= mgm.BlockSize { mgm.cipher.Encrypt(mgm.bufC, mgm.bufP) // H_i = E_K(Z_i) xor( // sum (xor)= H_i (x) A_i mgm.sum, mgm.sum, mgm.mul.Mul(mgm.bufC, ad[:mgm.BlockSize]), ) incr(mgm.bufP[:mgm.BlockSize/2]) // Z_{i+1} = incr_l(Z_i) ad = ad[mgm.BlockSize:] } if len(ad) > 0 { copy(mgm.padded, ad) for i := len(ad); i < mgm.BlockSize; i++ { mgm.padded[i] = 0 } mgm.cipher.Encrypt(mgm.bufC, mgm.bufP) xor(mgm.sum, mgm.sum, mgm.mul.Mul(mgm.bufC, mgm.padded)) incr(mgm.bufP[:mgm.BlockSize/2]) } for len(text) >= mgm.BlockSize { mgm.cipher.Encrypt(mgm.bufC, mgm.bufP) // H_{h+j} = E_K(Z_{h+j}) xor( // sum (xor)= H_{h+j} (x) C_j mgm.sum, mgm.sum, mgm.mul.Mul(mgm.bufC, text[:mgm.BlockSize]), ) incr(mgm.bufP[:mgm.BlockSize/2]) // Z_{h+j+1} = incr_l(Z_{h+j}) text = text[mgm.BlockSize:] } if len(text) > 0 { copy(mgm.padded, text) for i := len(text); i < mgm.BlockSize; i++ { mgm.padded[i] = 0 } mgm.cipher.Encrypt(mgm.bufC, mgm.bufP) xor(mgm.sum, mgm.sum, mgm.mul.Mul(mgm.bufC, mgm.padded)) incr(mgm.bufP[:mgm.BlockSize/2]) } mgm.cipher.Encrypt(mgm.bufP, mgm.bufP) // H_{h+q+1} = E_K(Z_{h+q+1}) // len(A) || len(C) if mgm.BlockSize == 8 { binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(mgm.bufC, uint32(adLen)) binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(mgm.bufC[mgm.BlockSize/2:], uint32(textLen)) } else { binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(mgm.bufC, uint64(adLen)) binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(mgm.bufC[mgm.BlockSize/2:], uint64(textLen)) } // sum (xor)= H_{h+q+1} (x) (len(A) || len(C)) xor(mgm.sum, mgm.sum, mgm.mul.Mul(mgm.bufC, mgm.bufP)) mgm.cipher.Encrypt(mgm.bufP, mgm.sum) // E_K(sum) copy(out, mgm.bufP[:mgm.TagSize]) // MSB_S(E_K(sum)) } func (mgm *MGM) crypt(out, in []byte) { mgm.icn[0] &= 0x7F mgm.cipher.Encrypt(mgm.bufP, mgm.icn) // Y_1 = E_K(0 || ICN) for len(in) >= mgm.BlockSize { mgm.cipher.Encrypt(mgm.bufC, mgm.bufP) // E_K(Y_i) xor(out, mgm.bufC, in) // C_i = P_i (xor) E_K(Y_i) incr(mgm.bufP[mgm.BlockSize/2:]) // Y_i = incr_r(Y_{i-1}) out = out[mgm.BlockSize:] in = in[mgm.BlockSize:] } if len(in) > 0 { mgm.cipher.Encrypt(mgm.bufC, mgm.bufP) xor(out, in, mgm.bufC) } } func (mgm *MGM) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { mgm.validateNonce(nonce) mgm.validateSizes(plaintext, additionalData) if uint64(len(plaintext)) > mgm.MaxSize { panic("plaintext is too big") } ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+mgm.TagSize) copy(mgm.icn, nonce) mgm.crypt(out, plaintext) mgm.auth( out[len(plaintext):len(plaintext)+mgm.TagSize], out[:len(plaintext)], additionalData, ) return ret } // Open the authenticated ciphertext. If authentication tag is invalid, // then InvalidTag error is returned. func (mgm *MGM) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { mgm.validateNonce(nonce) mgm.validateSizes(ciphertext, additionalData) if len(ciphertext) < mgm.TagSize { return nil, fmt.Errorf("ciphertext is too short (%d<%d)", len(ciphertext), mgm.TagSize) } if uint64(len(ciphertext)-mgm.TagSize) > mgm.MaxSize { panic("ciphertext is too big") } ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext)-mgm.TagSize) ct := ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-mgm.TagSize] copy(mgm.icn, nonce) mgm.auth(mgm.sum, ct, additionalData) if !hmac.Equal(mgm.sum[:mgm.TagSize], ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-mgm.TagSize:]) { return nil, InvalidTag } mgm.crypt(out, ct) return ret, nil }